

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 106079
ORIGIN NEA-04

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /005 R

66011

DRAFTED BY: NEA:EGABINGTON:BDF

APPROVED BY: NEA:EGABINGTON

-----100908Z 110769 /23

P 100659Z MAY 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 106079

FOR HIRSCH

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO AMMAN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS,
JERUSALEM FROM TEL AVIV MAY 09:

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 3262

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PFOR, IS

SUBJECT:CONVERSATION WITH MOSHE DAYAN

BEGIN SUMMARY: DAYAN OPPOSED THE ALLONPLAN OR THE MORE
DRASTIC SOLUTION OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WEST BANK
--ALTHOUGH HE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT MANY ISRAELIS WOULD
ACCEPT A RETURN TO THE 1967 LINES IF THE PACKAGE
INCLUDED REAL PEACE WITH GUARANTEES.HE PREFERS A
SLIGHTLY MODIFIED STATUS QUO AND POINTED TO JERUSALEM
AS A MODEL FOR AN ISRAELI-WEST BANK RELATIONSHIP. WHILE
WILLING TO RELINQUISH SHARM ASH-SHAYKH AND GOLAN (NOT
FOR ATTRIBUTION) UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES,HE
BELIEVES THE RAFAH APPROACHES ARE ESSENTIAL TO
ISRAEL'S SECURITY.ON DOMESTIC POLITICS, DAYAN
SEES EBAN HURT, DOES NOT BELIEVE THE DMC WOULD JOIN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 106079

A LIKUD COALITION AND DENIED HIS OWN INTEREST IN THE
JEWISH AGENCY CHAIRMANSHIP. END SUMMARY

1. CHARGE AND POLITICAL OFFICER MET WITH DAYAN
AT HIS HOME ON MAY 5. HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM
A SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT IN THE UK AND QUIPPED THAT
HE NOW SUBSTITUTES ON THE BANQUET CIRCUIT FOR

GOLDA MEIR, WHO NO LONGER TRAVELS, AND YITZHAK RABIN, "WHO HAS OTHER PROBLEMS."

2. THE DISCUSSION BEGAN WITH A REFERENCE TO DAYAN'S NEAR SUCCESS AT THE LABOR PARTY CONFERENCE IN STIFFENING THE PLATFORM PLAN ON THE WEST BANK. HE SAID THAT THE NEAR MAJORITY WAS LESS IMPORTANT THAN THE FACT THAT "I WAS RIGHT." IN ANY EVENT, HE CANNOT AGREE TO THE ALLON PLAN BECAUSE IT WAS DESIGNED NOT FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF ISRAEL'S INTERESTS BUT FROM WHAT THE ARABS WOULD ACCEPT. HOWEVER, THE ALLON PLAN IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS BECAUSE IT LEAVES THEM WITH A CRAZY QUILT, DENSELY POPULATED TERRITORY. THE ARABS DEMAND NOTHING LESS THAN COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. ONLY SHELI AMONG THE PARTIES (RAKAH EXCEPTED) ESPOUSES THIS LINE; BUT IF A CONCRETE OFFER OF PEACE WERE PART OF THE PACKAGE, AND WITHDRAWAL WERE ACCOMPANIED BY ADQUATE GUARANTEES, DAYAN FEELS THAT MANY OTHER ISRELIS WOULD ALSO ACCEPT RETURN TO THE 1967 LINES.

3. THIS, HOWEVER, HE SEES AS A BAD BARGAIN AND PREFERS TO SETTLEMENT TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL, OR EVEN THE ALLON PLA. JUDEA AND SAMARIA MEAN MUCH MORE TO ISRAELIS THAN MERELY THEIR IMPORTANCE FOR SECURITY. ALTHOUGH HE BELIEVES THE PRESENT MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS MADE MISTAKES (HE CRITICIZED ISRAELI TRAFFIC USING A ROAD FROM JERUSALEM TO AFULA THAT PASSES THROUGH CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 106079

NABLUS AND ASSERTED THAT ISRAELI TROOPS HAD NO BUSINESS GOING INTO THE NABLUS CASBAH), THE CURRENT ARRANGEMENT COULD CONTINUE WITH SOME MODIFICATIONS. JEWS SHOULD BE ABLE TO LIVE AND BUY LAND ANYWHERE ON THE WEST BANK JUST AS WEST BANK ARABS SHOULD BE ABLE TO WORK ANYWHERE THEY WANT. HE HELD UP THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN JERUSALEM AS A MODEL THAT COULD APPLY TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL PROPER AND THE WEST BANK.

4. SHOULD THE GOI NEGOTIATE A WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WEST BANK, "I WILL MAKE PLENTY OF NOISE." BUT HE DID NOT THINK LEAVING THE ALIGNMENT WOULD NECESSARILY BE PART OF HIS TACTICS IN OPPOSING WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID THAT THERE ARE MANY IN THE LABOR PARTY WHO WOULD JOIN HIM IN CHALLENGING SUCH WITHDRAWAL. HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE MATTER WOULD HAVE TO BE REFERRED TO THE PEOPLE IN AN ELECTION.

5. WHILE A FINAL SETTLEMENT WITH EGYPT AND SYRIA MAY BE POSSIBLE, THOSE COUNTRIES WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE STATUS QUO ON THE WEST BANK. FOR EXAMPLE, PROVIDED THERE WERE SUITABLE ARRANGEMENTS TO PROTECT ISRAEL'S INTERESTS, HE COULD ACCEPT WITHDRAWAL FROM SHARM ASH-SHAYKH AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS (ALTHOUGH HE WOULD NOT WANT TO SEE HIMSELF QUOTED TO THIS EFFECT). ON THE OTHER HAND, HE WOULD NOT YIELD YAMIT AND THE RAFAH APPROACHES: ISRAEL'S SECURITY REQUIRED SEPARATING THE GAZA STRIP WITH ITS TEEMING ARAB POPULATION FROM EGYPTIAN TERRITORY; OTHERWISE IN TIME GAZA WOULD RETURN TO THE EGYPTIAN ORBIT AND POSE A SECURITY THREAT TO ISRAEL'S HEARLAND. HE BELIEVED THAT SADAT WOULD UNDERSTAND THIS ARGUMENT AND ACCEPT THE BORDER RECTIFICATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 106079

6. TURNING TO THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, DAYAN SAID HE HAD HEARD THAT THE SITUATION FOR THE ALIGNMENT HAD RECENTLY IMPROVED. HE WONDERED AT THE CONTINUING STRENGTH OF THE ALIGNMENT DESPITE ITS MANY MISFORTUNES; PERHAPS IT WAS A REFLECTION OF THE CONSERVATISM OF ISRAEL'S VOTING HABITS. ONE BLOC VOTES SOLIDLY FOR BEGIN, COME WHAT MAY, AND ANOTHER LARGER BLOC IS IRREVOCABLY LOYAL TO THE ALIGNMENT. COMMENTING UPON THE RECENT BAD PUBLICITY FOR HIS PARTY, DAYAN SAID HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT ABBA EBAN HAD BEEN HURT BY THE INVESTIGATION OF HIS BANK ACCOUNTS. HE THOUGHT IT OBVIOUS THAT EBAN HAD EXCEEDED WHAT WAS ALLOWABLE UNDER HIS PERMIT AND, IF SUCH WERE THE CASE, MIGHT HAVE TO APPEAR IN COURT. A COURT CASE AT THIS TIME WOULD PROBABLY SPELL DOOM TO HIS CHANCES OF BEING MINISTER. ASKED ABOUT ANOTHER RECENT "SHOCK," HE COMMENTED THAT THE CRITICISM OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER'S REPORT WOULD HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON THE ALIGNMENT OR PERES--BUT THE RECENT VIOLENCE ON THE WEST BANK COULD, HOWEVER BE DAMAGING.

7. DAYAN COULD NOT SEE THE DMC ENTERING A COALITION WITH THE LIKUD. BEGIN WOULD NEVER COMPROMISE SUFFICIENTLY ON FOREIGN POLICY TO MEET THE DMC'S TERMS. DAYAN RELATED HIS OWN RECENT EXPERIENCE ("FLIRTATION") WITH THE LIKUD IN WHICH HE HAD SOUGHT SOME MODERATION OF THEIR PLATFORM POSITION THAT "THERE SHOULD BE ONLY ONE

SOVEREIGNTY WEST OF THE JORDAN."TO HIM THIS
MEANT ANNEXATION OF THE WEST BANK.IT WAS
"HYPROCRITICAL" FOR THE LIKUD TO CONTEMPLATE
IMMEDIATE ANNEXATION AND AT THE SAME TIME TALK
OF GOING TO GENEVA.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 106079

8. ASKED WHAT PORTFOLIO MIGHT BE AVAILBLE TO
YADIN IN AN ALIGNMENT/DMC COALITION, DAYAN
SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT YADIN WANTED TO HEAD
THE NEGOTIATING TEAM AT GENEVA. (COMMENT:
POSSIBLY AS MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO.) WITH
REGARD TO HIS OWN FUTURE, DAYAN SAID HE WAS NOT
INTERESTED IN A REPORTED OFFER TO HEAD THE
JEWISH AGNCY. HE SAID THAT YOSEF TEKOAH,
PRESIDENT OF NEGEV UNIVERSITY, HAD ASKED HIS
SUPPORT FOR TEKOAH'S CANDIDACY FOR THE POSITION. WITH A
CHUCKLE HE SAID: "THAT JOB INVOLVES TOO MUCH WORK." WITH
A SWEEPING GESTURE TOWRAD A GARDEN FESTOONED WITH
ANTIQUITIES FROM HIS VARIOUS DIGS, HE SAID, "I
PREFER THIS."

9. COMMENT: DAYAN SEEMED GENUINELY PLEASED TO
BE ASKED FOR HIS VIEWS.ALWAYS A LONER AND OFTEN
A MAVERICK, HE CONTINUES TO BE IN THE POLITICAL
SEMI-WILDERNESS. HE HAS NO ILLUSIONS THAT HE
WILL SERVE IN THE NEXT GOVERNMENT AND THERE IS
LITTLE INDICATION THAT THE SUDDEN RISE OF PERES,
AN ERSTWHILE DAYAN PROTEGE, HAS INCREASED HIS
INFLUENCE. HE IS WITHOUT A CONSTITUENCY IN THE
PARTY AND HAS UNMEASURE, BUT PROBABLY MINOR,
PUBLIC SUPPORT. STILL, HE CANNOT BE IGNORED;
HIS IDEAS INEVITABLY GENERATE CONTROVERSY AND
DESPITE THE YOM KIPPUR WAR SOMETHING REMAINS OF
HIS LEGEND. DUNNIGAN UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PEACE PLANS, POLITICAL SITUATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 10-May-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE106079
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: NEA:EGABINGTON:BDF
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770163-1229
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770573/aaaaciz.tel
Line Count: 210
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 10034597-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 12-Apr-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2580041
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CONVERSATION WITH MOSHE DAYAN BEGIN SUMMARY: DAYAN OPPOSED THE ALLONPLAN OR THE MORE DRASTIC SOLUTION OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WEST
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, IS, (DAYAN, MOSHE)
To: USUN NEW YORK
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/10034597-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009